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 1  On the notion of the BIC under Article 3 CRC, see Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests 
taken as a primary consideration (Article 3 para. 1). On the notion in (public) international 
law, see  C.  Focarelli ,  ‘ La Convenzione di New York sui diritti del fanciullo e ilconcetto 
di  ‘ best interest of the child ’ , ( 2010 )  Rivista di diritto internazionale ,  981 . On the BIC in 
private international law, see  M.  Distefano ,  Interesse superiore del minore e sottrazione 
internazionale di minori ,  CEDAM ,  Padua  2012 ;  K.  Lenaerts ,  ‘ Th e Best Interests of the Child 
Always Come First: Th e Brussels II bis Regulation and the European Court of Justice ’ , ( 2013 ) 
 Jurisprudencija/Jurisprudence (online), 1302 – 1328;  J.M.  Pobjoy ,  ‘ Th e Best Interests of the 
Child Principle as an Independent Source of International Protection ’ , ( 2015 )  International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly ,  vol.  64, 327 – 363 ;  O.  Lopes Pegna ,  ‘ L ’ interesse superiore 
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 1.  THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD AND THE 
 ‘ BRUSSELS II SYSTEM ’ : SETTING TERMS OF 
REFERENCE 
 Th e best interests of the child 1 (BIC) is the key principle of the 1989 CRC, one 
of most ratifi ed treaties in the world. Article 3 of the CRC states that the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration in all actions concerning 




del minore nel regolamento n. 2201/2003 ’ , ( 2013 )  Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e 
processuale ,  357 ;  R.  Schuz ,  ‘ Infl uence of the CRC on Hague Conventions ’ , ( 2010 )  Journal of 
Family, Law and the Practice ,  48 . 
 2  Reference is made to the situation of a child who might be separated from his/her parents 
(Article 9) to the situation of the common responsibilities of both parents for the upbringing 
and development of the child (Article 18), to adoption proceedings (Article 21), to the 
situation of children deprived of liberty being separated (Article 37) and to the situation of 
children accused of having infringed the criminal law. See C.  Focarelli, above n. 1, p. 981 ff . 
and  M. Zupan ,  Th e Best Interests of the Child: a Guiding Principle in Administering Cross-
Border Child-Related Matters , in  T. Liefaard and J . Sloth-Nielsen (eds.),  Th e United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Taking Stock aft er 25 years and looking Ahead , 
2016, at 214, where the Author points out the importance of the above provisions for resolving 
cross-border cases. 
 3  Th is principle is recalled also in other instruments of (public) international law. Reference 
is made, for example, to the Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination 
against women, the African Charter on the rights and welfare of the child, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. See J. M. Pobjoy , above n. 1, at 328. Th e impact 
of the best interests of the child in the Hague Conference on Private International Law ’ s 
Conventions is expressly analysed by  M. Zupan , above n. 2, at 215 – 219. 
 4  See J .M Pobjoy , above n. 1, at 328. In general, on the protection which instruments of 
public as well as private international law may grant to migrant children see  F.  Ippolito 
and  G.  Biagioni ,  Migrant Children:  Challenges for Public and Private International Law , 
 Editorialescientifi ca ,  Naples  2016 . 
 5  See  L.R.  Kiestra ,  Th e Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Private 
International Law ,  2013 ,  https://rechercheisidore.fr/search/resource/?uri=10670%2F1.
azcvbf ;  P.  Kinsh ,  ‘ L ’ apport de la jurisprudence de la Court Europ é enne des droits de l ’ homme ’ , 
in  P.  Lagarde (ed.),  La reconnaissance des situations en droit international priv é ,  Pedone , 
 Paris ,  2013 , pp. 43 – 45; ibid.,  ‘ Recognition in the Forum of a Status Acquired Abroad  – 
Private International Law Rules and European Human Rights Law ’ , in  K.  Boele-Woelki , 
 T.  Einhorn ,  D.  Girsberger and  S.  Symeonydes (eds.),  Convergence and Divergence in 
Private International Law  – Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr ,  Eleven International ,  Th e Hague 
 2010 , 272 ff .;  P. Ivaldi and  C.E. Tuo ,  ‘ Diritti fondamentali e diritto internazionale private 
dell ’ Unione europea nella prospettiva dell ’ adesione alla CEDU ’ , (2012)  Rivista di diritto 
internazionale privato e processuale , 736. 
 6  See UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14, para. 68, p. 15, 
where specifi c reference is made to the main instruments in force at that time (i.e. 1980 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 1993 Convention on 
the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, the 
situations. 2 As a well-established principle, 3 to what extent the BIC is an 
independent source of protection, for example, for migrant children, is widely 
debated. 4 
 Today, the BIC principle surely plays a relevant and growing role in private 
international law, mainly due to increasing interaction between human rights 
and private international law: human rights protection strongly infl uences 
the functioning of private international law rules, 5 which are now not only 
interpreted coherently but also shaped to grant protection to human (and 
in particular children ’ s) rights. On the other hand, the adoption of, as far as 
possible, uniform private international rules on matters concerning children is 
deemed in itself as facilitating the application and implementation of the BIC. 6 
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1973 Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance 
Obligations and the 1973 Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations), 
which have been a primary source of inspiration for the EU instruments in the fi eld. See 
also European Parliament Resolution of 28.04.2016 on safeguarding the best interests of 
the child across the EU on the basis of petitions addressed to the European Parliament 
(2016/2575(RSP)), para. 23, where Member States are called to encourage non-contracting 
States to join the 1993 Hague Convention  ‘ which would guarantee that all children benefi t 
from the same standards ’ . 
 7  See A .E. von Overbeck ,  ‘ L ’ irr è sistible extension de l ’ autonomie en droit international priv é ’ , 
in  Nouveaux itineraries en droit. Hommage  à Francois Rigaux , Bruylant, Bruxelles 1993, 
pp. 619 – 636. 
 8  See  G.  Douglas ,  ‘ Marriage, Cohabitation, and Parenthood  – from Contract to Status ? ’, in 
 S.N.  Katz ,  J.  Eekelaar and  M.  Macklean (eds.),  Cross Currents: Family Law and Policy in 
the US and England ,  Oxford Scholarship Online ,  Oxford  2000 , p. 212. 
 9  In this light, a new mechanism of surveillance and monitoring in respect of the best interests 
of the child has been set up, by virtue of the  ‘ Eurochild report ’ . See COM (2014) 224 fi nal, 
2013 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and SWD (2014) 
141 fi nal  – Commission Staff  Working Document accompanying the Report. On this point, 
see  M. Zupan , above n. 2, 220. 
 10  See art. 105 of Regulation 2019/1111. 
 11  See recital no. 5 of the Regulation 2201/2003. 
 A second reason possibly explaining the BIC ’ s growing relevance in private 
international law is the  ‘ irresistible extension ’ 7 of party autonomy to adults ’ 
relationships and their  ‘ liberalisation ’, which needs to be counterbalanced by 
greater attention to the protection of the BIC, with the child considered a weaker 
party in family relationships. Consequently, family law tends today to focus not 
on marriage, but on parent-child relationships. 8 
 EU private international law is developing coherently with these generally 
emerging global trends. Within the EU judicial area, interaction of private 
international law rules and fundamental freedoms makes it possible for adults to 
select a legal order that better satisfi es their interests in personal and economic 
matters. Against this background, the EU ’ s focus has shift ed onto children ’ s 
protection, in particular aft er the Lisbon Treaty: besides Member States ’ 
international obligations to protect the BIC derived from the CRC ’ s ratifi cation, 
today the EU itself is committed to pursuing the protection of children and their 
interests, as expressed in Article 3 TFEU and Article 24 of the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, which has achieved the same value as the fundamental 
Treaties. 9 
 In particular, the BIC ’ s increasing relevance clearly results from the evolution 
of the  ‘ Brussels II system ’, the cornerstone rules of EU private international law in 
family matters, originally embodied in Regulation 1347/2000 (Brussels II), now 
in Regulation 2201/2003 (Brussels II  bis ) and, starting from the 01 August 2022, 
in Regulation 2019/1111 (Brussels II  ter ). 10 A few months aft er the adoption 
of the Brussels II Regulation , the need to grant equal protection to all children 




 12  See COM (2002). With specifi c reference to the enlargement of the scope of application 
of the Regulation, see O.  Lopes Pegna , above n. 1, at 361. 
 13  Reference is made, in particular, to: (i) the introduction of special rules of international 
child abduction, supplementing those of the 1980 Hague Convention; (ii) the introduction 
of some space for party autonomy in choice of court; and (iii) the mechanism of the transfer 
of jurisdiction to a more appropriate forum. 
 14  See Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 as regards 
jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning the applicable law in matrimonial matters 
COM (2006) 399. 
 15  Th e urgent preliminary procedure (also known with the acronym  ‘ PPU ’ deriving from 
the French translation  ‘ procedure pr é judicielle d ’ urgence ’ ) is regulated by Article 23a 
of the Statute of the Court, Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure, paras. 39 and 40 of the 
Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary 
ruling proceedings, in OJ C 338 06.11.2012, pp. 1 – 6. See  T. Kruger and  L. Samyn ,  ‘ Brussels II 
bis: Successes and Suggested Improvements ’, (2016)  Journal of Private International Law , 146, 
where they point out how crucial this mechanism has been to adequate development of the 
law combined with respect of the rights of the children and families. On the relevance of the 
PPU mechanism in Brussels II  bis proceedings, see K.  Lenaerts , above n. 1, at 1303, and, 
with specifi c reference to child abduction proceedings, in particular where compared with 
the procedure  vis- à -vis the European Court of Human Rights, see  R.  Schuz ,  Th e Hague Child 
Abduction Convention:  A Critical Analysis ,  Hart Publishing ,  Oxford/Portland  2013 , p. 28. 
 16  See Council Decision of 20 December 2007 amending the Protocol on the Statute of the 
Court of Justice, OJ L 24 of 29 January 2008, p. 42; Amendments to the Rules of Procedure 
of the Court of Justice, OJ L 24 of 29 January 2008, p. 39; and OJ L 92 of 13 April 2010, p. 12. 
Th e PPU is available from 1 March 2008. 
 17  See  A.  Dutta and  A.  Schulz ,  ‘ First Cornerstones of the EU Rules on Cross-border Child 
Cases: Th e Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the Brussels IIa 
Regulation From C to Health Service Executive ’ , ( 2015 )  Journal of Private International Law , 
 1 – 40 , at 7. 
 18  On the recast procedure, see  Recasting the Brussels IIa Regulation. Workshop 8 November 2016 , 
PE 571.383; H.  Van Loon ,  ‘ Th e Brussels IIa Regulation: Towards a Review ? ’ ,  in Cross-
Border Activities in the EU  – Making Life Easier for Citizens , PE 510.003, 2015, pp. 177 – 207; 
 C.  Honorati ,  ‘ La proposta di revisione del regolamento Bruxelles II bis: pi ù tutela per iminori 
e pi ù effi  cacia nell ’ esecuzione delle sentenze ’ , ( 2017 )  Rivista di dirittointernazionale privato e 
processuale ,  2 – 55 ;  M.C.  Baruffi ,  ‘ Uno spazio di libert à , sicurezza e giustizia a misura di 
minori: la sfi da (in)compiuta dell ’ Unione europea nei casi di sottrazioneinternazionale ’ , 
( 2017 )  Freedom, Security and Justice: European Legal Studies ,  2 – 25 ;  Th. de  Boer , 
enlargement of its scope to include children born outside of wedlock, 12 but also 
in the adoption of innovative solutions in the area of parental responsibility. 13 
A few years later, the Commission embarked on the fi rst recast, focusing on 
matrimonial matters, 14 resulting in no changes to the Brussels II  bis Regulation, 
but in the adoption of a separate legal instrument applicable to cross-border 
divorces and separations (Regulation 1259/2012). 
 A novelty with an indirect, but crucial impact on the Brussels II  bis 
Regulation ’ s proper functioning in relation to the BIC is the urgent preliminary 
reference procedure (PPU ). 15 Aft er this fast track ’ s introduction in 2008, 16 the 
Court of Justice has consistently recognised urgency in cases within the scope of 
application of the Brussels II  bis Regulation and, in particular, in cases concerning 
a child ’ s separation from one of the parents. 17 In 2016, a second recast started, 18 
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 ‘ What We Should Not Expect from a Recast of the Brussels IIbis Regulation ’ , ( 2015 ) 
 Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht ,  10 ff  .;  T. Kruger and  L. Samyn , above n. 14, 
pp. 132 – 168;  E.  Rodriguez Pineau ,  ‘ La refundici ó n del Reglamento Bruselas II bis: de Nuevo 
sobre la function del derecho internacional privado europeo ’, ( 2017 )  Revista Espanola de 
Derecho Internacional ,  vol.  69, 139 – 165 ;  B.  Ubertazzi ,  ‘ Th e Hearing of the Child in the 
Brussels IIa Regulation and its Recast Proposal ’, ( 2017 )  Journal of Private International 
Law ,  568 – 601 ;  C.  Honorati ,  ‘ La proposta di revisione del Regolamento Bruxelles II-bis: 
pi ù tutela per iminori e pi ù effi  cacia nell ’ esecuzione delle decisioni ’, ( 2017 )  Rivista di 
diritto internazionale privato e processuale ,  247 – 282 ; J.  Borg-Barther ,  Jurisdiction in 
Matrimonial Matters  – Refl ections for the Review of the Brussels IIa Regulation , PE 571.361, 
2016. 
 19  See the Study on the assessment of Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 and the policy options for 
its amendment, (Final Evaluation Report) at  https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-
detail/-/publication/463a5c10-9149-11e8-8bc1-01aa75ed71a1/language-en , in particular at 
p. 53. 
 20  See Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility 
and on international child abduction (recast), COM (2016), 411, 30.6.2016, p. 2. 
 21  In this regard, it should be considered that Regulation 4/2009 does not expressly mention 
the BIC among its leading principles and the European Court of Justice has missed the 
opportunity to consider them as a guiding principle for the interpretation of the rules on 
jurisdiction, although reference is made to it in the joint cases C-400/13 and C-408/13, 
 Sanders ,  ECLI:EU:C:2014:2461 . On this point, see M . Zupan , above n. 2, at 222. It should 
be also pointed out that no express reference exists in other EU private international law 
instruments on family matters to the need of applying them coherently with the Brussels II 
 bis Regulation (whilst in the fi eld of civil and commercial matters, it is imperative to interpret 
Brussels Ia, Rome I and Rome II Regulations as a  ‘ system ’ , see recital no. 7 of the Rome I 
Regulation stating that its substantive scope as well as the provisions should be consistent 
with Brussels I Regulation and, therefore, also with Brussels Ia, as well as with Regulation 
Rome II). 
 22  On this topic, see  N. Bennet ,  ‘ Th e European Family in Crisis: Th e Consequences of Brexit 
on English Family Law ’ , in  Family Law , October 2018. On the eff ects of the Brexit on private 
international law instruments concerning children in the United Kingdom, see P.  Beaumont , 
focusing on parental responsibility, 19 and aimed at better protecting the best 
interests of the child by simplifying the procedures and enhancing their 
effi  ciency. 20 
 EU institutions have reviewed the existing rules in order to strike a new balance 
between the need to provide as clear-cut uniform rules of private (procedural) 
international law as possible based on abstract reasoning for the BIC involved 
in cross-border proceedings of parental responsibility and, conversely, the need 
to better protect the BIC in specifi c and concrete situations. Under the post-
Lisbon legal framework, this is a challenging task that requires a more proactive 
approach to the protection of the BIC. Th e task is challenging also because the 
Brussels II  bis Regulation, as previously mentioned, is the cornerstone of EU 
private international law instruments in family matters and, therefore, impacts 
other private international law rules concerning children. 21 
 Th e importance of the revision of such a key instrument is also confi rmed by 
the fact that, despite Brexit, the United Kingdom has participated in the recast 




 ‘ Private International Law Concerning Children in the UK aft er Brexit: Comparing Hague 
Treaty Law with EU Regulations ’ , available at  https://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/documents/
CPIL%20Working%20Paper%20No%202017_2.pdf. 
 23  For information on the status of the ongoing recast procedure, see the following web-page: 
 http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/fi cheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2016/
0190(CNS)#tab-0 .  
 24  Brussels II  bis (as well as Brussels II  ter ) Regulation has a double character: it provides rules 
on jurisdiction and recognition and execution, on one side, and autonomous rules concerning 
respectively matrimonial and parental responsibility matters, on the other. 
 25  Reference is made in C-184/14,  A v. B ,  ECLI:EU:C:2015:479 , where the Court confi rmed that 
in the absence of prorogation of jurisdiction towards ongoing proceedings on matrimonial 
matters, the courts where the children have their habitual residence shall retain jurisdiction 
on parental responsibility matters. Th is also means that no  lis pendens arises from the two 
proceedings mentioned. See  I.  Kunda and  D.  Vrbljanac ,  ‘ Lis Pendens ’  (Articles 16, 19) , 
in  C.  Honorati (ed.),  Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental Responsibility and 
International Abduction ,  Giappichelli ,  Turin  2017 , pp. 227 – 231. 
 26  Despite authoritative suggestions in this regard, see  A.  Borr à s ,  ‘ From Brussels II to Brussels 
II bis and Further ’ , in  K.  Boele-Woelki and  C.  Gonzales Beilfuss (eds.),  Brussels II bis: Its 
Impact and Application in the Member States ,  Intersentia ,  Antwerp  2007 , pp. 3 – 22, at p. 21. 
 In the following section, the amendments proposed by the institutions in the 
recast procedure and fi nally incorporated in the Brussels II  ter Regulation are 
considered through the lens of the BIC. 23 
 2.  IMPACT OF THE BIC PRINCIPLE: THE STRUCTURE 
AND SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
 Crucial for swift er application of the  ‘ Brussels II system ’ is clear determination 
of its (broad) scope of application and also clearer determination of its key 
notions  (i.e. parental responsibility matters and habitual residence of the 
child). Under the current rules, parental responsibility matters are completely 
autonomous from matrimonial ones: 24 when dissolution of marriage 
jurisdiction  is settled without clear evidence of prorogation in favour of 
that court  under Article 12 of Brussels II  bis , parental responsibility matters 
concerning a child born in wedlock shall be adjudicated by the court of 
her/his habitual residence. 25 In adopting Regulation 2019/1111, EU institutions 
have not taken the opportunity to create an independent instrument devoted 
only to issues of parental responsibility . 26 Even if that solution might have 
further increased the EU private international law instruments ’ fragmentation, 
practice has proved that in parental responsibility matters, the EU has been 
not only more successful in amending existing rules, but also in adopting 
innovative solutions. One might argue that a more precise determination of the 
Regulation ’ s  scope would have made its application easier not only internally 
(i.e. in relation to matrimonial matters), but also with regard to other EU 
instruments and other instruments in force globally. 
Intersentia 271
Impact of the Best Interests of the Child on the Brussels II ter Regulation
 27  Reference is made in the following Court of Justice case-law: C-404/14,  Matouskova , 
 ECLI:EU:C:2015:653 , and C-565/16,  Saponaro ,  ECLI:EU:C:2018:265 . See  M. Zupan ,  ‘ Scope 
of Application, Defi nitions and Relations to Other Instruments ’ , in  C. Honorati (ed.), 
 Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental Responsibility and International Abduction , 
above n. 25, at 5. 
 28  See recital no. 32 of the Regulation 2019/1111, where the example of a succession dispute in 
which a child is involved and a guardian  ad litem needs to be appointed is made. 
 29  See Recital 92 Regulation 2019/1111. 
 30  See art. 97 of Regulation 2019/111. On this topic, see  M. Zupan , above n. 2, pp. 33 – 35, and 
 T. Kruger and  L. Samyn , above n. 14, pp. 151 – 154. 
 31  Reference is made to C-435/06, A, ECLI:EU:C:2007:714 and C-92/12 PPU, Health Service 
Executive v. S.C. and A.C., ECLI:EU:C:2012:255. 
 In relation to other EU instruments, the Brussels II  bis (as well as  ter ) 
Regulation keeps its cornerstone position in family matters, for example, through 
Article 3 of Regulation 4/2009 and Article 5 of Regulation 2016/1103, which 
coordinate their rules on jurisdiction with those provided by the Regulation. 
When such coordination is not expressly established, the European Court of 
Justice tends to confi rm the centrality of Brussels II system rules. 27 
 Furthermore, incidental questions on parental responsibility arising before 
an authority of a Member State without jurisdiction under the Regulation are 
expressly addressed by the new Regulation, which states that the jurisdictional 
authority should solve the incidental question, with eff ects limited to the 
proceedings at stake. 28 
 In external relations with instruments in force globally, a step forward 
in the BIC has been made by better clarifying the Brussels II  ter Regulation ’ s 
relationship with the 1996 Hague Convention (ratifi ed by all EU Member States). 
More precisely, the 1996 Hague Convention confl ict of law rules are expressly 
recalled as applicable by the Member States ’ authorities. 29 Such a step, even if it is 
not much celebrated, surely increases global uniformity and aligns the Brussels 
II system with modern EU Regulations on private international law matters, 
providing rules aimed at solving all private international law issues arising 
in cross-border situations. Furthermore, while confi rming the Regulation ’ s 
jurisdictional priority over that of the 1996 Hague Convention anytime the 
child concerned habitually resides in an EU Member State ’ s territory, in specifi c 
circumstances, the new rules extend application of some 1996 Hague Convention 
jurisdictional rules to fi ll gaps in the BIC in practice. 30 
 Practice shows that diffi  culties arise in establishing the scope of application 
 ratione materiae and, in particular, whether a public law issue falls within the 
Brussels system. 
 Th e European Court of Justice case law has provided some guidance, 31 which 
has not been incorporated into new rules, for example, in the recitals. 
 In this regard, a most delicate issue which has been considered in the recast 




 32  Under EU law, the unaccompanied minors are those children who are not accompanied by 
adults who are responsible for them whether by law or by the practice of the Member State 
concerned and for as long as they are not eff ectively taken into the care of that adult (see 
article 2(j) Dublin Regulation). 
 33  See Prel doc special session no. 7. 
 34  In the Explanatory report (no. 36), with regard to the meaning of the above exclusion, 
Prof. Paul Lagarde pointed out that  ‘ Th ese are decisions which derive from the sovereign power 
of States. Only decisions on these matters are excluded: in other words, the granting of asylum or 
of a residence permit. Th e protection and representation of children who are applying for asylum 
or for a residence permit fall, to the contrary, within the scope of the Convention ’. 
 35  See C-435/06,  C , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2461, and C-523/07,  A , ECLI:EU:C:2009:225; C-92/12 
PPU,  Health Service Executive v. S.C. and A.C. ,  ECLI:EU:C:2012:255 . 
 36  Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, 2005, CRC/GC/2005/6, 
paras. 19 – 21. 
 37  See  S. Corneloup (coordinator),  Children On the Move: A Private International Law 
Perspective , Study for the Juri Committee, PE 583.158  – June 2017, p. 13 – 14, where the group 
of researchers expressly suggests recalling Lagarde ’ s explanations (see above n. 33) concerning 
the scope of application of the 1996 Hague Convention also within the context of the new 
Brussels II  bis Regulation. Such an invitation has not been followed by the Commission in its 
proposal. 
 38  See European Parliament legislative resolution of 18 January 2018 on the proposal for 
a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, and on international child 
abduction (recast) ( COM(2016)0411  – C8-0322/2016  –  2016/0190(CNS) ) (Special legislative 
procedure  – consultation  – recast). 
minors. 32 With reference to the 1996 Hague Convention, the Brussels II system ’ s 
primary source of inspiration, this issue was debated during a Special Session in 
October 2017. 33 Th e majority of States did not agree on possibly and expressly 
extending the Convention rules ’ application to unaccompanied minors, relying 
mainly on the Convention ’ s exclusion from the scope of its application the 
rights of asylum and immigration under Article 4(j). 34 Under the Brussels II  bis 
Regulation, the same exclusion is provided under recital 10. Furthermore, 
a specifi c ground of jurisdiction based on presence in case of refugee or 
internationally displaced children is expressly foreseen under Article 13(2). 
However, starting from the considerations above and taking into account, on 
the one hand, the European Court of Justice ’ s approach, which tends to construe 
the scope of application of the Regulation as extending to all measures for the 
protection of minors, including those taken by public authorities, 35 and, on the 
other, the relevance of the BIC principle 36 and its interpretative function, there 
is little doubt that the Brussels II  bis Regulation applies also to migration and 
asylum and, in particular, to unaccompanied minors. 37 
 Th e new rules confi rm the above approach and, in this light, references 
to decisions on rights of asylum and immigration have been removed. 
Furthermore, whilst, on the one hand, the proposal of a specifi c recital providing 
that jurisdiction rules should be applicable to refugee children and children 
who have been internationally displaced, not only by disturbances in their 
country, but also for socio-economic reasons, has not been accepted, 38 on the 
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 See European Parliament legislative resolution of 18 January 2018 on the proposal for 
a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, and on international child 
abduction (recast) ( COM(2016)0411  – C8-0322/2016  –  2016/0190(CNS) ) (Special legislative 
procedure  – consultation  – recast). 
 39  See recital no. 17 of the Regulation 2019/111. 
 40  See C-335/17,  Neli Valcheva v.  Georgios Barbanarakis ,  ECLI:EU:C:2018:359 , at para. 36, 
where the Court points out that in order to avoid the adoption of confl icting measures in 
the best interests of the child, the same court which has given the custody to the child to the 
father and has recognised the right to visit of the mother, shall deal also with the issue of the 
right to visit to a person diff erent from the parents. 
 41  Th e European Parliament was in favour of the introduction of a defi nition, see European 
Parliament Resolution 28 April 2016 on safeguarding the best interests of the child across 
EU on the basis of the petitions addressed to the European Parliament (2016/2575(RSP)), 
but the Commission ’ s proposal does not take into account this indication and the European 
other, recital 25 of Regulation 2019/1111 introduces further guidance as to 
coordinate the application of the new rules with the analogous jurisdictional 
rules of the 1996 Hague Convention. More precisely, under the above recital, 
the rule on jurisdiction grounded on the presence of the child under Article 11 
of the Regulation should be applied only to children who had their habitual 
residence in a Member State before the displacement and, therefore, assuming 
that children who had their habitual residence in a third State could be granted 
a  forum under the relevant rules of the 1996 Hague Convention. 
 Further steps toward better assessment of the scope of application have been 
made. First, the new rules apply to children up to 18 years old (including those 
having acquired capacity before that age, through emancipation for example), 
but rules on child abduction, coherent with the 1980 Hague Convention, apply 
only to children under 16 years old. 39 Th e introduction of such a rule at EU 
level should surely be appreciated since it grants uniform interpretation of a key 
notion, avoiding any reference to national laws. 
 With regard to the scope of application  ratione personae , the new Regulation 
has not taken the opportunity to provide guidance on the position of persons 
having  de facto family ties with the child in cross-border proceedings concerning 
parental responsibility matters, even if some rules of Regulation 2019/111 
expressly recognise the possibility for them, being interested parties, to act in 
the BIC. 
 On the other hand, the European Court of Justice has recently confi rmed the 
trend toward extending the scope of application  ratione personae in the  Valcheva 
case, where a grandmother ’ s right of visitation was recognised as falling within 
Brussels II  bis ’ scope of application. 40 
 Habitual residence is another key notion for determining the Brussels II  bis 
Regulation ’ s scope of application and its functioning. Notwithstanding its 
importance and diffi  culties in practical application, the new Regulation does 




Parliament has not reiterated it during the recast, see European Parliament Legislative 
Resolution 18 January 2018 on the proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, 
the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and matters of 
parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast) (COM(2016)411  – 
C8-0322/2016  – 2016/0190(CNS)). 
 42  Reference is made in case C-376/14 PPU,  C. v. M. ,  ECLI:EU:C:2014:2268 , at paras. 50 – 57. 
 43  Such a solution has been adopted in Regulation 650/2012 in recitals 24 and 25. 
 44  Th is approach has been recently followed by the Hague Conference of Private International 
Law for the 1993 Hague Convention on protection of children and co-operation in respect 
of inter-country adoption: given the challenges encountered by some contracting States 
in determining the habitual residence of the adoptive parents as well as of the adoptable 
children, a note has been recently published. Th e document is available at  https://assets.hcch.
net/docs/12255707-4d23-4f90-a819-5e759d0d7245.pdf . 
 45  See  S.  Cornelup ,  ‘ Les r è gles de comp é tence relatives  à la responsabilit é parentale ’ , in 
 H.  Fulchiron and  C.  Nourissat (eds.),  Le nouveau droit communautaire du divorce et de la 
responsabilit é parentale ,  Dalloz ,  Paris  2005 , pp. 79 ff . 
Justice case law has not only indicated the rationale underlying this notion 
and the elements considered for its assessment, but has also provided specifi c 
guidance in diffi  cult cases, for example, concerning new born children in 
abduction proceedings. 42 Th e choice not to provide a specifi c defi nition of 
habitual residence in parental responsibility issues and, thus, not to transform 
a factual notion into a legal one, seems coherent with the overall purpose of 
facilitating free movement of persons and their integration into new countries; 
it also seems coherent with the approach adopted under the aegis of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law. Given its crucial role, however, the 
introduction of a few recitals to synthesise the assessment method of the child ’ s 
habitual residence , as indicated by European Court of Justice case law, would 
have surely aided the Regulation ’ s swift er application. 43 Still, it is possible that 
the Commission will adopt an adjourned version of the Practice Guide, which, 
as happened for previous versions, and will provide specifi c guidance for the 
interpretation of such a notion. 44 
 3. RULES ON JURISDICTION 
 Rules on jurisdiction now in force are shaped for the BIC following the criterion 
of proximity : 45 since citizenship no longer necessarily refl ects the proximity of a 
child to a specifi c jurisdiction, the court of the child ’ s habitual residence decides 
the case. Habitual residence is therefore  in abstracto the ground that better grants 
protection to the BIC ( rectius of all children) at the procedural level. Assigning 
jurisdiction to the court that eff ectively and  in concreto is better placed to decide 
the specifi c case, makes it exceptionally possible to move from the general rule 
and to apply special ones, provided that such action serves the BIC. Besides 
the general rule of jurisdiction, holders of parental responsibility can prorogue 
jurisdiction in favour of courts exercising jurisdiction on matrimonial matters 
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 46  Given that  – as clearly stated by the CJEU in the case of  E v. B  –  ‘ (j)urisdiction in matters 
of parental responsibility must be determined, above all, in the best interests of the child ’ , 
fl exibility is crucial. 
 47  See Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement 
of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on 
international child abduction (recast)  – General approach, available at  https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/register/en/content/out?&typ=ENTRY&i=ADV&DOC_ID=ST-15401-
2018-INIT . 
 48  See recital no. 19 of Regulation 2019/1111. 
 49  See recital no. 21 of Regulation 2019/1111. 
 50  See art. 8 Regulation 2019/1111. 
 51  See P. B eaumont , above n. 22. 
or of courts of the State having a substantial connection with the child; on the 
other hand, transferring the case to a more appropriate  forum is also possible. 
 Th is fl exible structure of rules on jurisdiction 46 is not altered in the new 
Regulation. However, the important amendment proposed by the Commission 
that rules on jurisdiction will no longer refer to a court, but more generally to an 
authority, in order to encompass any judicial or administrative authority having 
jurisdiction on matters of parental responsibility, has not been included in the 
fi nal version. 47 
 Th e new Regulation not only confi rms that rules on jurisdiction are shaped 
toward the BIC, but it also emphasises that such rules should be applied in 
compliance with the BIC, as defi ned by Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and by the CRC. 48 Under the post-Lisbon legal framework, a general duty 
to interpret and apply any piece of EU law in light of the BIC arises;  a fortiori , this 
shall be followed in applying the Brussels II system ’ s rules concerning parental 
responsibility. Th us, any time a departure from the general rule of the child ’ s 
habitual residence is established based on party autonomy or jurisdictional 
transfer, specifi c reasoning that justifi es such a departure in light of the BIC 
should be provided. 
 In relation to the general rule establishing jurisdiction of the court of the 
child ’ s habitual residence , Regulation 2019/1111 clarifi es that, in case of the 
child ’ s lawful relocation, jurisdiction should follow the child. For proceedings 
already pending, the rule is to maintain the existing jurisdiction until the 
proceedings come to an end. However, the courts are also allowed to transfer 
jurisdiction, which, therefore, may move with the child. 49 Th ese clarifi cations 
do not aff ect, however, the rule establishing  perpetuation jurisdictionis for three 
months for proceedings modifying a decision on access rights in the Member 
State where the child ’ s former habitual residence was before lawful transfer, 
provided that the parent left  behind still has her/his habitual residence in that 
State. 50 An important novelty is the enhancement of party autonomy in the 
choice of court and, given that the achievement of an agreement on jurisdiction 




 52  Reference is made in case C-428/15,  Child and Family Agency v. J. D and R.P.D , ECLI: 
EU:C:2016:819. 
 53  See on this point  T. Kruger and L . Samyn , above n. 14, at 148, who point out that the existing 
rule of Brussels II  bis is very clear, compared to other rules existing in other Regulations 
where, for example, it has been necessary for the Court to clarify the scope of application of 
the rule. 
 Under Article 10 of Regulation 2019/1111, proceedings in parental 
responsibility can be initiated (i) before the courts of a Member State having 
a substantial connection with the child, (ii) provided that the exercise of 
jurisdiction is in the BIC, and (iii) anytime the parties, as well as any holder of 
parental responsibility, so agree, not only at the time the court is seised, but also 
in the course of the proceedings. 
 As with choice of court, the new regime proposed also emphasises the 
exceptional character of the rule providing for a case ’ s transfer to a more 
appropriate  forum , and thus also confi rms the necessity not to transfer the case 
further. An important novelty is the  ‘ bi-directional ’ character of the transfer: 
besides the transfer from the court having jurisdiction to a more appropriate 
forum, under Article 14 of Regulation 2019/1111 a court not having jurisdiction 
may request a transfer of jurisdiction to the court of habitual residence of the 
child. Such a transfer shall be exceptional in nature and justifi ed by the existence 
of a particular connection with that court, which is considered to be better 
placed to assess the BIC in that particular case. 
 No further guidance for the application of the transfer mechanism is provided. 
However, the European Court of Justice has made important statements in this 
regard in the  Child and Family  Agency case, 52 where the Court has clarifi ed not 
only the transfer mechanism ’ s rationale, but also indicated elements relevant for 
assessing whether the transfer complies with the BIC. First, a transfer shall have 
a  ‘ concrete and real added value ’ that must be evaluated  not based on Member 
States ’ substantial laws, but on procedural ones. Second, the transfer will be 
deemed in the BIC any time it does not negatively aff ect the child ’ s free movement 
or that of persons involved. Important novelties with regard to provisional 
measures have been proposed and these are of great importance for granting 
protection to children involved in cross-border disputes. Notwithstanding its 
clear wording, 53 the European Court of Justice has made many decisions on 
the Brussels II  bis Regulation ’ s Article 20, aimed at clarifying not only its scope 
of application, but also the eff ects deriving from the adoption of protective 
measures in other proceedings. Under the Court ’ s interpretation of current 
rules, provisional measures adopted by a court not having jurisdiction on the 
merits shall have only territorial reach and, therefore, cannot circulate within 
the European judicial area. Consequently, such measures cannot grant eff ective 
protection to the child. 
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 54  See  T. Kruger ,  ‘ Enhancing Cross-Border Cooperation ’ ,  in Recasting the Brussels IIa 
Regulation. Workshop 8 November 2016 , PE 571.383, p. 39. 
 55  See recital 30 of Regulation 2019/1111. 
 56  Recital no. 40 of the Commission ’ s proposal points out that such measures, when ordered 
without the respondent being summoned to appear, should not be recognised and enforced 
under the Regulation. Unlikely under the regime concerning the execution of decisions, 
under Article 35.3, provisional and protective measures do not need to be notifi ed or 
communicated, neither translated into the offi  cial language of the State of destination. 
 57  It resulted in decisions that are oft en not executed or executed with signifi cant delays. 
Furthermore, the intervention of specialised lawyers is necessary, and costs may vary from 
 € 1000 to  € 4000. 
 58  See  S.M.  Carbone and  C.E.  Tuo ,  Il nuovo spazio giudiziario europeo in materia civile e 
commerciale. Il Regolamento CE n. 1215/2012 ,  Giappichelli ,  Turin  2016 . 
 59  On the proposed rules on abolition of  exequatur and execution of decisions, see  E. Rodriguez 
Pineau , above n. 17, at p. 146 – 152. 
 60  See art. 34 of Regulation 2019/1111. Even if the  exequatur is abolished with regard to all 
decisions on parental responsibility matters, decisions on the rights of visit as well as those 
 In an attempt to strike a new balance between the need to grant immediate 
protection to the child and the need to prevent forum shopping , 54 it has been 
originally proposed that protective measures should  ‘ travel ’ with the child and, 
therefore, that such measures should be automatically enforceable in all Member 
States and that they should automatically expire as soon as the authority of the 
competent jurisdiction has ruled on the matter ’ s merits. 
 In the end, such amendments have not been included: as a general rule, 
only provisional measures adopted by the court having jurisdiction  ‘ travel ’ with 
the child. However, as an exception, the same regime has been granted also to 
those provisional measures adopted by the courts of the State of refuge for the 
protection of children from the grave risk of being exposed to an intolerable 
situation in return proceedings. 55 , 56 
 4. MORE EFFICIENT CIRCULATION OF DECISIONS 
 Major problems have been encountered concerning the execution of decisions in 
other Member States. 57 Th us, the recast ’ s intervention was twofold: (i) abolition 
of the  exequatur for all decisions concerning parental responsibility matters , 
as has recently been done in civil and commercial matters with the Brussels Ia 
Regulation; 58 and (ii) measures to enforce decisions more effi  ciently (despite 
States ’ well-known reluctance  vis- à -vis the imposition of a standard aff ecting 
national procedural rules). 59 
 In the new Regulation, the abolition of  exequatur , already applying for 
decisions on visitation rights and on the child ’ s return, has been extended to all 
decisions falling within the Regulation ’ s scope of application, including custody 




on the return of the child still follow a special regime, as expressly provided by section II of 
Title IV of Regulation 2019/1111. See  E. Rodriguez Pineau , above n. 17, at p. 146. 
 61  C-195/08 PPU. 
 62  See art. 56 of Regulation 2019/1111. 
 63  See  E. Rodriguez Pineau , above n. 17, at p. 149. 
 64  Reference is made in Articles 30 – 36 of the Commission ’ s proposal. 
can be immediately executed in the destination State, where, under recital 60, 
competent authorities are granted the possibility of ordering, taking or arranging 
for specifi c measures at the enforcement stage, such as non-coercive but also 
coercive measures. 
 Besides the possibility of starting an action for non-recognition of a foreign 
decision in parental responsibility matters, expressly envisaged by the new 
Regulation, incorporating the achievement of the  Rinau decision, 61 it is now 
also possible to suspend, or even refuse, execution under specifi c circumstances: 
not only when execution is suspended in the State of origin, but also when there 
is still room for an appeal against the decision itself. 
 Temporary suspension of the enforcement of the decision is also possible in 
case of grave risk of physical or psychological harm to the child. Such a request 
shall be made not only by the person against whom enforcement is sought, as 
well as by any interested party acting in the BIC, but also by the child concerned 
(where applicable under national law). However, if the grave risk is of a lasting 
nature, enforcement shall be refused. 62 
 As authoritatively observed, 63 the Commission has proposed the  exequatur ’ s 
abolition as inevitable. However, whether such a step is justifi ed on the ground of 
enhancing mutual trust and European integration, or on the ground of enhancing 
the BIC, remains an open question. Besides the  exequatur ’ s abolition, further 
measures have been introduced in order to make execution of foreign decisions 
in Member States more effi  cient. 64 To start the execution, the interested person 
shall provide the certifi cate, accompanied by a copy of the decision before the 
authority that has been granted competence for execution by the Member State 
where the decision shall be executed. 
 A very important change has occurred with regard to the so-called  ‘ privileged 
decisions ’ on rights of access and return of the child: while under the current 
rules there is no way to stop their recognition and enforcement, under Article 50 
of Regulation 2019/1111, in compliance with the principle  rebus sic stantibus , 
their recognition and enforcement shall be refused if and to the extent that it 
is irreconcilable with a later decision relating to parental responsibility and 
concerning the same child. Th e diff erent positions mentioned confi rm a common 
need to strike a new balance between competing purposes: on the one side, 
extending the  exequatur ’ s abolition to all decisions covered by the Regulation 
coherent with the Stockholm Program and with results achieved in other fi elds 
of civil judicial cooperation is clearly a step forward in enhancing mutual trust; 
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 65  In this regard, it should be considered that in all proceedings, it is of great importance to 
avoid the exercise of a basic right of the child becoming an excessively onerous responsibility 
and this is all the more important in cross-border cases  ‘ since the consequences of the choice 
expressed by the child can have a far heavier impact on the child ’ s environment compared 
to cases geographically circumscribed to a small area ’ . See  I. Pretelli ,  ‘ Child Abduction and 
Return Proceedings ’ , in  Recasting the Brussels IIa Regulation , above n. 17, at pp. 10 – 11. 
 66  It should be noted that this is one of the rules supplementing the 1980 Hague Convention, 
where a general obligation to hear the child is not clearly stated, but derives implicitly from 
Article 13.2. On this point, see  B. Ubertazzi ,  ‘ Hearing of the Child ’ , in C . Honorati (ed.), 
 Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental Responsibility and International Abduction , 
above n. 25, at p. 171. 
on the other side, making it possible under Article 56 to suspend or refuse 
enforcement of all decisions (included the  ‘ privileged ’ ones) in case of grave risk 
for the child, as well as under Article 50 to refuse recognition and enforcement 
of the  ‘ privileged ’ decisions (for which automatic execution has been working 
since the Brussels II  bis Regulation) anytime they are  ‘ irreconcilable ’ with a later 
decision, clearly shows a greater attention to BIC  in concreto . 
 5.  THE NEW PROACTIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD 
HEARING THE CHILD AND MEDIATION 
 One of the most signifi cant improvements in procedures concerning children 
is the acknowledgment that off ering the child a genuine opportunity to express 
her/his views freely is crucial for the BIC principle ’ s eff ectiveness . Hearing the 
child not only empowers her/him through direct participation in procedures 
aff ecting her/him, but also better enables the judge or authority to assess the 
factual situation, a particularly diffi  cult task in cross-border proceedings. 65 
In Regulation 2201/2003, despite a commitment in recital 33 to respect for 
fundamental rights, hearing the child still plays a limited role. First, an explicit 
requirement to hear the child is limited to child abduction procedures: when 
the 1980 Hague Convention rules on the general obligation to return the child 
in case of abduction and on exceptions to the above obligation apply, it shall be 
ensured that the child is given the opportunity to be heard, unless this appears 
inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity. 66 
 Notwithstanding the absence of a general requirement, failure to hear 
the child may be a ground for non-recognition of judgments in parental 
responsibility matters. More precisely, under Article 23(b), a foreign decision on 
parental responsibility may not be recognised in another EU country any time a 
child capable of forming her/his own views, in the absence of reasons of urgency, 
has not been heard. 
 A third fi eld in which hearing the child plays a role is the issuance of certifi cates 




 67  Article 21  – Right of the child to express his or her views:  ‘ 1. When exercising their jurisdiction 
under section 2 of this Chapter, the authorities of the Member States shall, in accordance with 
national law and procedure, provide the child who is capable of forming his or her views with 
a genuine and eff ective opportunity to express his or her views, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body. 2. Where the court, in accordance with national law 
and procedure, gives a child an opportunity to express his or her view in accordance with this 
Article, the court shall give due weight to the views of the child in accordance with his or her 
age and maturity.’ 
 68  See Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, in Recasting 
the Brussels IIa Regulation  – Workshop on 08.11.2016, p. 70. Clearly, the two relevant Hague 
Conventions do not prevent the contracting States from hearing children in proceedings 
aff ecting them in accordance with their national procedural rules regarding the hearing of 
the child (as is clearly confi rmed in Article 23(2)(b) of the 1996 Hague Convention, which is 
directly inspired by Article 12 of the Convention on the rights of the child). 
 69  Article 26  – Right of the child to express his or her views in return proceedings  –  ‘ Article 21 
of this Regulation shall also apply in return proceedings under the 1980 Hague Convention.’ 
for decisions concerning the child ’ s return. As is well known, these decisions 
are the fi rst in the EU judicial space benefi ting from the special regime of direct 
enforceability, subject to the issue of specifi c certifi cates, on which the court 
must declare, by  ‘ ticking ’ a specifi c box, that the child had an opportunity to be 
heard, unless doing so was considered inappropriate. As the European Court of 
Justice has clearly pointed out in the  Aguirre Zarraga case , courts of the State of 
origin decide whether hearing the child is appropriate and, if so, for taking all 
measures appropriate to the hearing ’ s arrangement, having regard for the BIC 
and each case ’ s circumstances. Th e current rules do not provide methods and 
means by which national courts should hear the child; they just recommend the 
use of EU rules on the taking-of-evidence Regulation. 
 Regulation 2019/1111, while confi rming the recommendation above, takes 
a signifi cant step forward in enhancing the BIC by providing a general, but 
very detailed, duty to hear the child in all proceedings concerning parental 
responsibility. Under Article 21, 67 all authorities exercising jurisdiction in 
proceedings concerning parental responsibility will have a duty to: (i) ensure 
that a child capable of forming views is given the genuine, eff ective opportunity 
to express those views freely during the proceedings; (ii) give due weight to the 
child ’ s views according to age and maturity; and (iii) document its consideration 
in the decision. Such a solution is unprecedented: neither the 1996 Convention 
nor the 1980 Convention require that a child capable of forming her/his own 
views have a genuine, eff ective opportunity to express those views freely in 
judicial and administrative proceedings. 68 
 In addition, the new rules reiterate the duty to hear the child in abduction 
proceedings 69 and confi rm EU institutions ’ desire to enhance further the child ’ s 
fundamental right to be heard. 
 In the same vein, a new pro-mediation stance is present. Article 25 of 
Regulation 2019/1111 imposes on the competent court a duty to examine 
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 70  On this topic, see I . Pretelli ,  ‘ Child Abduction and Return Proceedings, in Recasting the 
Brussels IIa Regulation ’ , above n. 17, pp. 10 – 11. Th e Author also points out that the idea 
of compulsory mediation has been rejected during preparatory works, on the ground that 
mediation is based on the willingness of the parties to conclude an agreement under the 
guidance of experts, and it is very unlikely that a party who is forced to enter into mediation 
will cooperate. However, the article points out that it might be possible to consider the 
solution of a compulsory intervention of a mediator in relation to the compulsory hearing of 
the disputed child. Th is could also work as a fi rst step of the two parents resuming dialogue. 
 71  See Recital no. 43 of Regulation 2019/1111. 
whether parties are willing to engage in mediation to fi nd, in the BIC, an agreed 
solution, provided this does not unduly delay child abduction proceedings. 70 
Under the new rules, competent authorities have a duty to consider achieving an 
amicable solution through mediation and other appropriate means for all cases 
concerning children, in particular in international child abductions. Reference 
is also made to the possibility for competent authorities to be assisted, where 
appropriate, by existing networks and support structures for mediation in cross-
border parental responsibility disputes. 
 Th e European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2018 has proposed a 
specifi c amendment imposing on competent authorities, aft er assessment of 
the parties ’ desires, to ask them to engage in mediation . Th e Parliament also 
proposed: (i) a few amendments to facilitate parties ’ access to mediation 
(including a mention of fi nancial aid); and (ii) the introduction of a new 
provision 71 stressing the importance of mediators ’ specifi c education in cross-
border family disputes. However, such proposals have not been included in the 
fi nal version of the Regulation. 
 None of the institutions have proposed to include in the new rules a specifi c 
reference to the European Parliament Coordinator on children ’ s rights (formerly 
Mediator for International Parental Child Abduction), which has the power to 
provide assistance and also to encourage parties to have access to mediation. 
A reference within a recital would surely have been useful to let people, and not 
just experts in the fi eld, know of its existence. 
 6.  ASSESSMENT OF THE CHILD ’ S SITUATION IN 
 ‘ MOVING ’ WITHIN THE EU JUDICIAL AREA 
 Among the novelties proposed, particularly important are the possibilities of 
collecting information on the child and assessing the compliance of her/his 
situation. More precisely, under the new rules, central authorities of Member 
States have a general duty of cooperation not only to discover a child ’ s 
whereabouts, but also to collect and exchange information (also concerning the 
situation of a parent, a relative or other person who may be suitable to care for 




 72  See article 80 of Regulation 2019/1111. 
(ii) on any procedures under way concerning the child, or (iii) on decisions 
concerning the child. 72 
 Besides the general possibility of assessing, through cooperation and 
exchange of information between central authorities, a child ’ s situation and 
reporting on the child, in order to better decide cross-border issues concerning 
parental responsibility and to facilitate adoption of decisions related to a child ’ s 
moving within the EU judicial space, the new Regulation also introduces specifi c 
rules asking for an assessment of the child ’ s situation for the purposes of placing 
her/him abroad or deciding on her/his return aft er an abduction. 
 Starting from the child ’ s cross-border placement, the main criticisms of its 
functioning have been tackled. Under the new rules, the receiving State’s consent 
is mandatory and it shall be provided before the child’s placement. Furthermore, 
because placement as a measure of protection is generally urgent, 74 the proposed 
rules introduce a three-month time limit for the receiving State to decide on the 
placement, which, together with the  exequatur ’ s abolition, surely enhances the 
mechanism ’ s functioning. For the BIC, however, the most important novelty is 
the rule requiring the submission of a report on the child. Under Article 82 of 
Regulation 2019/1111, the requesting authority has a duty to transmit a report 
on the child, together with reasons for the proposed placement or provision of 
care. More precisely, the proposed rule asks the central authority of the Member 
State of origin to transmit to the central authority of the Member State where the 
child is to be placed  ‘ a request for consent which includes a report on the child 
together with the reasons of the proposed placement or provision of care ’, and 
also to provide these documents with the necessary translation. In providing for 
the duty to transmit a report on the child, together with reasons justifying the 
measure of protection, the proposed rule aligns the new Regulation with rules 
provided by Article 33 of the 1996 Hague Convention. 
 No specifi c reference is made (i) to the need to safeguard the child ’ s rights 
and, in particular, the right to maintain personal contacts with parents, or (ii) to 
the need to provide solutions of care granting, as much as possible, continuity 
in a child ’ s upbringing and the child ’ s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic 
backgrounds. Both of these suggestions, even without having binding character, 
should surely be considered and possibly followed in draft ing the report to be 
transmitted to the central authority of the State where the child will be placed. 
Furthermore, given the proposed rules ’ lack of further indications as to the 
report ’ s content, guidance provided by Lagarde ’ s Explanatory Report in the 1996 
Hague Convention shall surely be considered. More specifi cally, the Explanatory 
Report indicates that the requesting authority shall provide information 
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 73  See the Explanatory Report on the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention, at 593, para. 143. 
Th e Explanatory Report is available at the following address:  https://www.hcch.net/en/
publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=2943 . 
 74  See recital 48 of Regulation 2019/1111. 
on the child ’ s situation and on reasons for the proposed placement or provision 
of care. 73 
 As for the requested Member State ’ s consent , the proposed rules take an 
important step forward not only by making consent necessary in all EU Member 
States, preliminary to a child ’ s transfer, but also in providing a deadline of three 
months for the requested Member State to give consent or not. On the other 
hand, unfortunately, the new rules do not make any reference to the grounds 
on which the requested Member State may deny consent and reject a child ’ s 
placement. Th is is clearly regrettable considering that placement is a measure 
of protection for children in need of care and, consequently, denial of consent 
opposes the BIC  in abstracto and in the specifi c situation. Lack of guidance 
for solving a dialectic between the BIC justifying the consent request and the 
requested State ’ s interests justifying denial is likely to aff ect good and uniform 
functioning of cross-border placement. 
 A  ‘ substantial ’ assessment of the child ’ s situation is also required in child 
abduction procedures. Deep, critical analysis of the proposed rules on child 
abduction procedures is provided in Ruth Lamont’s contribution to this 
volume. For the present work ’ s purposes, however, attention is paid to the 
 ‘ overriding mechanism ’ or  ‘ second chance procedure ’ and, in particular, to 
the need for the court of habitual residence, when deciding on whether to 
replace the non-return order provided by the court of the Member State where 
the child has been wrongfully removed with a decision of return, to examine 
questions of custody of the child by thoroughly examining all circumstances, 
including, but not limited to, the conduct of the parents and taking into 
account the best interests of the child. 74 
 Th e duty to undergo such an assessment clearly fi nds inspiration from 
ECtHR  case law and, in particular, from the  Neulinger and  Kampanella 
decisions, in which the Court asked for an  ‘ in-depth examination of family life ’ 
in order to decide on the return of the children illicitly abducted. While such a 
thorough examination was not possible in a procedure focused on the child ’ s 
return as in the Brussels II  bis Regulation, the new rules now ask for it in the 
context of a broader procedure on the merits. Together with the opposition 
procedure considered in the previous section, the requested examination shift s 
the balance between the BIC  in abstracto (i.e. immediate return to the habitual 




 75  See Commission proposal COM(2016)411, p. 8. 
 76  See General Comment No 14, p. 4. 
 77  See  M.C.  Baruffi ,  ‘ La responsabilit à genitoriale: competenze e riconoscimento delle 
decisioni nel Regolamento Bruxelles II ’ , in  S.M.  Carbone and  I.  Queirolo (eds.),  Diritto di 
famiglia e dell ’ Unione europea ,  Giappichelli ,  Turin  2009 , p. 262. 
 7.  IS THE BIC BETTER PROTECTED BY THE NEW 
RULES ? 
 Th e Commission ’ s purpose was a  ‘ prudent and focused ’ recast aimed at  ‘ better 
protect[ing] the best interests of the child by simplifying the procedures and 
enhancing their effi  ciency ’. 75 Balancing the need to provide clear-cut solutions, 
aimed at reaching the overall purposes of EU private international law coherently, 
with protection ( in abstracto and in general) of the BIC, and the need to provide 
fl exible devices granting  in concreto the BIC ’ s protection has proved to be no easy 
task. In assessing whether this aim has been reached, the BIC ’ s three dimensions 
may be considered: 76 (i) substantive, i.e. the child ’ s right to have her/his best 
interests assessed and taken as a primary consideration ; (ii) interpretative, i.e. 
granting priority to the interpretation most eff ectively serving the child ’ s best 
interests; and (iii) procedural, i.e. asking for a specifi c evaluation of the possible 
impact of a decision on the child or the children concerned. 
 In the new Regulation, clearly, the procedural dimension plays a primary role 
in the identifi cation of the court best placed to adopt decisions and to circulate 
decisions, agreements or public acts on parental responsibility matters in the 
European judicial space. In both respects, the proposed rules try to strike a new 
balance between  ‘ procedural values ’ and the BIC. 
 As far as jurisdiction is concerned, the general rule of the child ’ s State of 
habitual residence is further strengthened by the new provision establishing 
that pending proceedings shall also follow the child ’ s moves, thereby further 
enhancing predictability and certainty. On the other hand, small steps toward 
the enhancement of party autonomy and, therefore, of fl exibility, have been 
taken by giving parties the possibility of agreeing on jurisdiction not only at the 
beginning, but also during proceedings (if the Member State ’ s law so provides). 
 More signifi cant changes occur with regard to the movement of decisions, 
where a step toward the enhancement of mutual trust has been made by virtue 
of the  exequatur ’ s abolition for all decisions on parental responsibility. Such a 
change is counterbalanced by the possibility of suspending, or even refusing, the 
enforcement of a decision any time the enforcement of a decision would expose 
the child to a grave risk. 
 Th e BIC principle ’ s interpretative dimension is signifi cantly strengthened: 
such a principle, which traditionally has been the  fi l rouge of the Brussels II 
system, 77 is now expressly recalled under the new rules. Beside this, as previously 
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 78  Th e new rules do not expressly specify how broad the assessment shall be. Such an assessment 
should take into consideration elements necessary for assessing the BIC: the child ’ s views, 
the child ’ s identity, the preservation of the family environment and maintenance of relations, 
the child ’ s care, protection and safety, the situation of vulnerability, and the child ’ s rights to 
health and education. See General Comment No. 14, above n. 1, at pp. 12 – 18. 
mentioned, the overall EU legal framework demands more proactive action for 
the protection of children ’ s rights. 
 Relevant changes have also to do with the principle ’ s substantial dimension : 
an assessment of a child ’ s situation in light of the BIC principle is required under 
the proposed rules in child abduction and cross-border placement cases, to 
obtain a better picture of the child ’ s situation and, therefore, decisions better 
tailored to the individual child. 78 
 Th e adoption of Regulation 2019/1111 clearly shows EU institutions ’ eff orts 
toward better protecting children ’ s rights in cross-border parental responsibility 
procedures, the major diffi  culty being striking a balance between the BIC  in 
abstracto and the BIC  in concreto . While the new Regulation seems to take steps 
in both directions and grants suffi  cient fl exibility to move from one notion to the 
other, the challenge will be to develop consistent practice within the EU judicial 
space when considering the BIC in  concreto . Crucial, in this respect, will be the 
role of the European Court of Justice, benefi ting the PPU ’ s fast track. 
 

